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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates a set of email negotiations in order to explain a high number of 
deadlocks. The paper argues that one reason is the combination of cognitive effort characteristic 
of the e-mail genre, and the argumentative pattern found when two parties simultaneously try to 
persuade the other of the justice of their cause. 
For a negotiation involving the wording of a contract, the evidence suggests that, 
while there is a distinct advantage in the features of reviewability and revisablity, the email 
format allows selective attention to the other party’s arguments, which can be shown to 
block suggestions and lead to sub-optimal results. 
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Introduction 
Email has become the rule rather than the exception for at least a large part of the 
negotiation process in many international companies (Schoop, Köhne and Staskiewicz, 2006). 
International, and hence also intercultural, negotiations are routinely done by email. But while 
the advantages of email makes it a first choice for many tasks, particularly if it saves travelling 
costs, the evidence is mixed with regard to its effect on negotiation.  
On one hand, there is evidence that computer mediated communication (CMC) is too lean 
a medium to facilitate agreement between people with conflicting interests; though the subjective 
judgment of the scope of electronic channels differs with the user’s experience (D’Urso & Rains, 
2008), in the negotiation literature, even a small amount of social interaction makes a difference 
to the results obtained (e.g. Morris et al., 2000).  
But on the other hand, when the actual wording of a document is at stake, the written 
medium should provide an advantage, as the entire history of exchanges is available and there is 
no pressure for immediate response  (Dennis, Fuller & Valacich, 2008; Loewenstein et al., 
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2005). These two features provide an opposing expectation, viz. that in these circumstances, the 
email medium improves the possibility of settlement. 
The present paper is the result of an experiment carried out in the course of training 
negotiation skills. The simulation has been used in class for years with very little deadlock; but 
when the medium was switched to email, the deadlock ratio went up steeply. What is it in the 
communication process conveyed by email that produces this effect? It is argued here that media 
richness is not the answer. Emails exist in print, but the exchange structure sometimes mimics 
talk; the paper will show that the process is different from oral negotiation in that it produces a 
central ambivalence in cognitive focus in holding together information, and a different pattern of  
response when the oral and the written characteristics of email collide. 
In the following, some features of the email medium are discussed with the hypotheses that 
they have given rise to in relation to negotiation. Section 2 describes the data collection and the 
results; since all negotiation is about finding common ground, the exchanges are examined for 
the structure of the moves and the responses they produce; and since the personal relationship 
between negotiators plays a role in much of the literature, the data is examined for possible 
problems with face or civility in this exchange process. Section 3 discusses the tendencies that 
can be found as a possible corrective to media richness theory in relation to negotiation. 
 
1. Background 
To establish a background, we need to clarify if there is reason to predict a poor result 
directly from the characteristics of the medium. 
Negotiations happen when it is in both parties’ interest to talk, and no one party can 
dictate terms. The relationship between negotiators is credited with a considerable effect, 
especially when the negotiation takes places in a dyad rather than in large meetings, where 
participants tend to produce a discourse recognizably coloured by the side they represent. 
The interactional tone, and the trust or distrust that underlies it, are all influenced by 
intangible factors like social attraction, voice, body language etc. For an overview over 
cognitive and material influences on Party and Other in the negotiation process, see 
Thompson & Nadler (2002); Thompson (2009); for special attention to the language aspect, 
see Bülow (2009). 
The negative view: Negotiating with the Faceless Other. In electronic 
communication the relationship between the parties is notoriously vulnerable. In terms of 
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media richness theory, as originally conceived by Daft & Lengel (1984), email is a lean and 
distant medium: no visual access, no audible voices, no synchronicity in interaction. If the 
parties do not know one another, the social clues can be crucial. Evidence has been collected 
for years with bargaining games where results can be measured in outcome figures; they 
show that people with a prior relationship have an easier time establishing a sense of group 
identity and common ground (Wilson et al., 2008), and that a social relationship leads to 
fewer refusals and more trade-offs and value-creating strategies (Pesendorfer & Koeszigi, 
2007).  
Even a brief acquaintance helps; in a series of tests, Morris, Thompson and their 
colleagues showed the effect of “schmoozing”: participants dealing with out-groups (at 
another university) produced better results and much more positive expectations if they had 
had a brief, social telephone conversation before the email negotiation began (Drolet & 
Morris, 2000; Moore et al., 1999; Morris et al., 2000; Thompson & Nadler, 2002). 
Also, meagre social relations have been shown to reduce social pressures (to be nice) 
and hence engender some hostility; thus conflicts have a way of getting out of hand when 
each side reciprocates what they consider slights (Friedman & Currall, 2003). Distrust of 
motives and hence impasse are found more frequently (Volkema & Rivers, 2008). In other 
studies, CMC reduces outcome satisfaction, though the numerical results do not suffer 
(Purdy & Nye, 2000). Thus relationships are clearly in jeopardy if bargaining happens 
without the sense of an ingroup; with such odds against it, it would seem that relying on 
email for negotiation is courting disaster. 
The positive view: Negotiating with time to think. On the other side of the coin, 
however, the leanness of the medium is a strength; far from being a poor relation of the real 
thing, CMC has valuable properties, chief among which is the medium’s capacity for 
carrying information and for retaining it. Secondly, CMC may influence the perceived status 
of the negotiators. 
Reviewability and revisability. A complex exchange, like negotiation and decision–
making, requires both information and interpretation. Dennis, Fuller & Valacich (2008) 
make the point that for information, media low in synchronicity are better suited: providing 
a great deal of information face-to-face is cognitively difficult to handle and hence tiresome. 
On the other hand, for getting agreement a high level of synchronicity is better, because 
feed-back will come in small instalments, thus rectifying misunderstandings as they occur. 
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For email negotiation, this means that partners can rely on the medium to carry large 
amounts of information for them, and to provide the time to do the cognitive processing at 
leisure. Time is essential to master information, in order for the negotiator to get a picture of 
the Other’s needs and priorities, and agreement comes much later. The more intricate the 
argument, the more time will matter: the expectation of rapid turn-taking was enough to 
stump the receiver of a complicated argument in a study by Loewenstein et al. (2005). Here, 
sellers using Instant Messenger were able to claim more value, because the buyers could not 
generate rebuttals in time; this effect was not seen using email (or simpler arguments). 
The conclusion seems to be that negotiators needing time to think are well served by 
email. If the negotiator is also a second-language user, dealing with unfamiliar, foreign 
norms and expectations, reflection time is a precious commodity with clear advantages over 
face-to-face meetings. Thus Pesendorfer & Koeszigi (2006) show that synchronous 
electronic negotiation games provide less friendly and more competitive behaviour than a-
synchronous email, mostly because people exchange more information when they have the 
time to make it relevant. 
In terms of genre characteristics, the principal difference between face-to-face and 
email negotiation is what Dennis, Fuller &Valacich (2008) call reviewability and 
revisability, i.e., that in the written mode, the negotiator can keep track of what has been said 
so far by scrolling down over the exchanges; and that it is possible to write a response, 
review it and change one’s mind several times before pressing “send” (Friedman & Currall, 
2003). Again, for a distant negotiator (physically or psychologically), who needs to tread 
carefully and not make mistakes, email would seem to take the pressure off. 
For agenda setting, too, reflection helps in matters of decisions about information 
giving, offers and requests. But paradoxically, while email affords the chance to review and 
revise, the medium is best known for its casual characteristics. This, too, has been shown to 
be an advantage: in a rare study of a protracted email negotiation over agent rights between 
a Western and Eastern company, Jensen (2009) observes that what would have been 
embarrassing language mistakes and inadequacies in a letter are hardly noticeable in a mail. 
Social cues and personal relations.  While email may screen out social cues, there is 
also evidence of its potential for providing social identification: accessibility, dynamic 
exchange and high informality provide a sense of nearness  (Wiesenfeld, Raghuram & 
Garud, 1999). 
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However, phrasing matters, for informality carries a danger of incivility. Explicit 
negative emotion is clearly bad for the receiver’s face. Thus in a study of the eBay dispute 
resolution site, attacks on face drastically reduced the likelihood of resolution for claimants 
who used high-intensity words about their reaction ( “angry”, “despise”, “disgusted”) and 
told the other party what to do (“shouldn’t”, “need”, “must”) (Brett et al., 2007).  Even a 
token display of respect and positive emotion seems to be a factor measurable in the 
negotiation processes (Hine et al., 2009). 
In a similar vein, Griessmair & Koeszegi (2009) notice the difference between 
conditions phrased as ultimatums and those phrased as trade-off options (“we won’t do X 
unless you do Y” vs “if we can both agree to X, then we can also do Y”). Phrasing under 
pressure is always a danger and a particular problem for second-language users; it can be 
assumed, then, that while CMC is sometimes associated with brash communication styles, 
the revisability feature should advantage negotiators who are otherwise careful about face-
preserving strategies. 
Finally, relationship is a rather ambiguous entity in negotiations. While it was shown 
above that parties were more comfortable after “schmoozing”, the other factor is that dyads 
that orient to relational goals, trying to be nice, regularly underperform; this tendency has 
been called relational accommodation (Curhan et al., 2008), and seems to be mostly 
applicable to women. When they try to accommodate Other, they achieve lower joint gains, 
and therefore, the issue of power and status is necessarily important. 
One of the least power-dominated and most optimistic studies on CMC, Amichai-
Hamburger & McKenna (2006), reports that the Internet creates a protected environment, 
where group members overcome anxiety about each other, perceive similarity and discard 
the harmful stereotypes that produce hostile attributions. Virtual teams here share more 
information than equally dissimilar groups meeting face-to-face (in fact, 50 per cent more, 
which is impressive), and the option of communicating from the comfort of their own home 
makes them open to communication based on equality. 
Equality, however, is only an advantage for the underdog. Where younger members or 
newcomers may feel empowered, negotiators in strong positions may feel subtly cheated. In 
a face-to-face meeting, they would have dominated the conversation through their evident 
power base or through cleverness, wit and charisma (Owens, Neale & Sutton, 2000). It is 
therefore no wonder that email exchanges also contain covert powerplay: for example, both 
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Jensen (2009) and Owens et al. (2000) notice that it counts as a power move when one party 
leaves a longish gap in the correspondence, and if the environment is right, people still seem 
to react to the status and power that they perceive from the texts (Weisband, Schneider & 
Connolly, 1995). Thus important aspects of the relational interaction between the negotiators 
can be conveyed by email as well as face-to-face. 
With these considerations, it seems that in many respects CMC carry equivalent 
conditions to the face-to-face condition, and that the advantages of email negotiations 
outweigh the disadvantages for anyone with a substantial amount of cognitive processing to 
do. It is clearly not just the leanness or richness of the medium in itself that leads to 
deadlock. 
 
2. The data 
The test case that was chosen is a variant on the well-known Harvard case “Discount and 
Hawkins”, adapted for local purposes. It is particularly interesting because its success 
depends on the exchange of information about prioritized interests, for both parties to arrive 
at a satisfactory result. The case concerns the wording of a clause in a contract, setting out 
rights and obligations, which means that there are no measurable results in terms of 
bargaining for profit; rather, agreements should meet the most important goals of both 
parties. Actual wording matters in the negotiation, as part of the argumentation needs to be 
in Other’s legitimate interest sphere to produce results (Bülow-Møller 2005) 
Participants. Dyads were formed from different years and classes of international 
graduate students at a large European business school. All participants had taken an 
academic course in the principles of negotiation and all volunteered to perform the task in 
their spare time over two weeks. They did not know their partners and never saw them face-
to-face. There were no native speakers of English in the experiment, so no one had an 
advantage with respect to formulation and argumentation. Out of twenty-seven original 
dyads, twenty-three transcripts were returned; of these, four were discarded as incomplete, 
because negotiators who thought they had finished had not actually reached an agreement on 
both the contested issues. Eleven dyads produced a clear agreement, and eight broke down. 
It is this last figure that is particularly worrying.  
It should be stated at once that deadlock could happen because the negotiators reason 
that they can find a better alternative; but there is no a priori reason why this should be more 
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apparent on the mail. If the high failure rate is to do with the medium, it is a challenge to 
find categories that that can be compared; also, with the small number of cases, no statistical 
evidence would stand up: all that can be found is tendencies. With this reservation, however, 
tendencies can be found, and representative examples will be quoted below, comparing the 
11 successes with the 8 deadlocks. 
The problem. The case concerns the wording of a contract between a developer of a 
projected shopping centre and his or her proposed anchor tenant, i.e. a large tenant with 
considerable appeal for customers that assures the financers that the venture is viable - here 
a large and successful retailing chain specializing in towels, curtains and other furnishing for 
kitchens and bathrooms. With the rest of the contract settled, the two problem clauses 
concern Use and subletting of the premises, an area that can be a deal-breaker for most 
lessors in similar circumstances. 
Briefly, it is in the tenant’s interest keep all possible freedom to withdraw if revenue is 
disappointing, while the lessor or landlord must have the security of a long-term lease in 
order to finance the venture, and must control the mix of tenants for the sake of the customer 
base. Consequently, in essence, the retailer’s ideal version reads “the lease may be 
terminated at any time” and “Tenant may freely sublet or assign the lease to a third party”, 
and the retailer’s standard contract reflects this view. The lessor’s ideal version is that “the 
lease is for 25 years” and “Tenant may not sublet or assign the lease to a third party without 
written approval”, and this was the contract proposed by the developer.  
On the basis of the material that was made available to the students, both jointly and 
separately, realistic negotiators should assess Other’s interests and realize that the most 
helpful trade-off in this case is the time factor – early security for the lessor, tapering off to 
(a measure of) freedom for the tenant after the first ten years or so. The whole agreement 
can boil down to three or four sentences, once both parties have realized that they can give 
each other assurances that settle fears without compromising their goals. In class, in the oral 
condition that usually takes between one and two hours of work for the dyads, this 
simulation will routinely produce one or two deadlocks out of 20 to 30 dyads, and perhaps 
three or four that fail to settle both issues without noticing that the agreement is faulty. 
The analysis. On the basis of the discussion about advantages and drawbacks in email 
communication, it was decided to compare the successful transcripts with the deadlocks for 
differences in 
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- tone and civility, 
- structure of argumentation and information,  and 
- structure of responses. 
Tone and civility. To deal with the least tangible matter first, the corpus shows no 
particular difference between successful and unsuccessful dyads when checked for pleasant 
phrasing. All exchanges in the corpus start out with a great deal of politeness and 
expressions of high hopes, and they tend to be conventionally regretful when they deny 
requests (more of this later). The large majority of turns end with a conventional 
outstretched hand, like “I’m looking forward to hearing from you if this is acceptable”. 
There is no flaming or explicit negative emotion remotely like the instances of “angry” or 
“despise” mentioned by Brett at al. (2007). The only example of feelings running high is 
from the successful corpus, where a long silence gives rise to an outburst accusing the Other 
of powerplay instead of collaboration; it seems to work, in that the outburst extracts a 
sensible response, including an excuse, and when the ruffled feathers are smoothed the 
frustrated party apologizes.  It seems that the written mode, or rather, the letter convention, 
is instrumental in keeping the tone civilized. The results from this study bear out Brett et al. 
(2007), where positive emotion is no prediction of resolution in the eBay conflicts (whereas 
negative emotion is a clear indication of deadlock). 
Successful exchanges.  As it was argued above, the email medium is particularly 
suited to detailed argumentation and drafted agreements; but, paradoxically, in business 
correspondence it is also particularly suited to quick checks that move the business along. It 
was therefore decided to look more closely at the longest turns and the shortest turns in the 
exchanges, to see what they accomplished. 
The lessors, the representative of the developer, had been instructed to contact their 
prospective tenant to finalize the deal. In the successful part of the corpus, the most frequent 
pattern is that the number of words peak in turn no. 4, corresponding to a structure where the 
lessor sets out his or her problem, the tenant makes a counter claim, the lessor proposes a 
minimal change to their original idea or asks for further details, and the tenant then produces 
both argumentation, assurances and a detailed proposal, normally based on the tenant’s own 
original contract proposal. 
This is important: the party that manages to impose his or her own wording on the 
proposal will often be in control of the agenda. As an indicator, the party who imposes the 
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last condition, or drafts the last proposal, is far more visible in print than in a conversation, 
and the corpus was checked for this last move. 
If the negotiation is going well, there might be every reason to raise a brief question or 
comment quickly. But if there is less movement, short responses could also be too brusque 
to be helpful, and this could be where the exchanges get what Friedman & Currall (2003) 
call ‘out of sync’. It is therefore to be expected that it is the short responses that will prove 
different in the two categories. 
Table 1 below shows 
- first, the number of turns, excluding one pair of  introductory meta-turns ensuring 
an open channel in dyads 5 and 7, 
- secondly, the length in number of words of the shortest negotiation turn for each 
dyad, excluding greetings  (like Hi again, Dear Susanna, Best regards), and 
excluding the final turn, which is normally just confirmation and/or mutual 
congratulations;   
- thirdly, the length in number of words of the longest turn, again excluding initial 
and final greetings; 
- fourthly, the position of this longest turn in the exchange, and 
- fifthly, the participant who suggested the final changes, terms or conditions . 
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TABLE 1 
Characteristics of successful negotiation exchanges 
 
 No of shortest longest long turn final 
  turns turn turn position change 
     _______________________________________________________ 
 
1 6 79w 261w 2 Tenant 
2 6 85w 308w 4 Tenant 
3 7 148w 622w 4 Tenant 
4 13 11w 354w 4 Tenant 
5 8 11w 264w 5 Tenant 
6 8 46w 241w 6 Tenant 
7 13 34w 267w 3 Lessor 
8 6 159w 348w 4 Tenant 
9 8 94w 258w 1 Tenant 
10 4 171w 302w 3 Lessor 
11 7 252w 640w 4 Tenant 
 
 
Information and argumentation.  In the successful dyads, the longest turns range 
between 241 and 640 words; the majority is both preceded and followed by relatively long 
turns. The parties seem to settle into a rhythm, accommodating each other. All five instances 
of turn no.4 set out above contain a) the tenant’s appreciation of the lessor’s point that the 
mix of tenants in the shopping mall is a legitimate concern, b) assurances that the tenant can 
be trusted to share that interest, c) further argumentation that the freedom requested is 
actually within a reasonable range and part of a nation-wide scheme by the retailer (and 
hence out of the negotiator’s hands), and d) a new offer, a draft paragraph. The factors are 
not necessarily in that order, but this is the canonical pattern. 
Judging by the final draft, the tenants remain in the driving seat in 9 out of 11 
successful agreements. In dyads 7 and 10, however, the lessors take the early initiative, 
presenting the most elaborate input as turn no.3; thus the only reason dyad 10 can settle in 
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just four turns is that the lessor has produced a carefully crafted package with several 
options that allows the tenant to prioritize her interests and pick the corresponding option. 
Responses. While relatively long responses can be expected to take the preceding 
arguments into considerations, the very short turns must serve a different purpose. The four 
turns under 50 words were therefore singled out for comparison. They turn out to have the 
following functions (all examples are quoted verbatim): 
a) metacommunication (lessor accepting apology): No worries Roger - get back to me 
whenever you have time.(5) 
b) passive opening invitation (from tenant, turn 2): Thank you for your email. We are 
disappointed that our standard terms are not in compliance with your ambitions for the 
Brandon Mill Center but hope, however, that we are able to accommodate and reach a 
suitable solution. Please send us you proposed solution today COB (6) 
c) passive mid-stream invitation (from lessor): That sounds acceptable. Please send a draft as 
soon as possible (4) 
d) small amendment (by lessor): I understand and appreciate your concern and therefore 
suggest:"The tenant may use the premises only in a manner consistent with K&B corporate 
Strategy. Subject to the  strategy not deviating significantly from its principal" (7) 
In other words, there is nothing here to suggest that the short turns disrupt the flow. 
Unsuccessful exchanges. In comparison, the deadlock exchanges have the characteristics 
set out in Table 2. The only change from the columns in Table 1 is that, instead of checking for 
the last terms before settlement, this table lists the participant who gave up, either by formally 
rejecting the hope of agreement or by “walking away from the table”, i.e. cutting off the 
exchange. 
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TABLE 2 
Characteristics of unsuccessful negotiation exchanges 
 No of short long long turn  final 
  turns turn turn position walk away 
  __________________________________________________________ 
 
 12 6 115w 291w 1 Lessor 
 13 4 65w 407w 2 Lessor 
 14 5 57w 279w 1 Tenant 
 15 4 125w 491w 4 Lessor 
 16 5 170w 390w 4 Lessor 
 17 8 44w 308w 2 Lessor 
 18 7 247w 1165w 3 Lessor 
 19 6 79w 136w 5 Tenant 
 
 
The average number of turns is lower, indicating less patience or will to settle in at least 
one of the partners. There is no dominant pattern: the most elaborate turn varies more widely 
(between 136 and 1165 words), and this contribution is found anywhere in the first five turns. 
The only resemblance with Table 1 seems to be that the tenants are making conditions: in six out 
of eight cases, it is the lessor who gives up. 
The most interesting difference, however, is in the use of the short turns. The two shortest 
turns run as follows: 
a) rejection (by lessor): We understand this, but unfortunately we cannot offer you a long-term 
rent as long as you insist on your standard-clause. And we cannot offer you a short term 
lease, because we need to have along-term anchor-tenant in order to get the shopping-
center financed.(17) 
b) partial rejection (by lessor): Thank you for your e-mail. Yes you can find your own tenant, 
but it has to be a subtenant in the business of kitchen and bathroom textiles and we  need to 
approve the subtenant. So I am sorrry, that we cannot be  more flexibel about the contract. 
What do you say, can we come to an agreement? (14) 
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These two extracts follow the same pattern: they function very much like speech in their 
offhand reference to the prior turn, and they claim value or argue exclusively on their own 
territory. In other words, the (not at all unusual) oral option of taking a turn just saying “No, that 
won’t work for me”, has serious repercussions in print. For illustration, here follows the second 
example in context: 
Tenant (turn 4): It is correct that we are a bit concerned about the long rental periode. 
We are not sure whether the market will change in 20  years and would therefore be 
very happy if we could write some  flexibililty into the contract concerning subletting 
or sharing  the premises. 
I do understand your concern about the financial situation but I think it would be better 
for the both of us if you would let us find our own tenants, should the situation change. 
We are of  course very carefull about who we choose.  
Maybe we could discuss whether it is ok with the restrictions the first 10 years or so, 
and then, […] maybe we could discuss us  being able to choose our own tenants 
without any interference? 
 I am looking forward hearing from you   
 
Lessor (turn 5): Thank you for your e-mail. 
Yes you can find your own tenant, but it has to be a subtenant in the business of 
kitchen and bathroom textiles and we  need to approve the subtenant. So I am sorrry, 
that we cannot be  more flexibel about the contract. What do you say, can we come to 
an agreement? 
 
In turn 4, the tenant makes a useful suggestion (“discuss whether it is ok with 
restrictions for the first ten years or so”), but it is never considered by the lessor. The 
tenant’s message consists of 
a) A refusal of a prior suggestion, couched as a statement of concern about the long period 
(“we are a bit concerned”, with backing argument (“the market [may] change”), 
b) Acknowledgement of Other’s concern (“I do understand”), overridden by a suggestion 
(or plea, rather) in her own interest (“but […] it would be better”), with assurances (“we 
are […]very careful”),  
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c) A concrete suggestion that would meet both parties’ most salient interests (“discuss […] 
restrictions the first ten years”), 
d) And a formalized greeting with a smiley. 
This is email doing what email does best: providing a fairly complex background-
problem-solution composition, making use of the written mode to present the case in the 
shape of a (fast) letter. 
But the response picks out one particular aspect, viz. section b) above. The lessor 
(correctly) sees no reason why the tenant should not find a sub-tenant but (also correctly) 
insists on final approval, thus dismissing part of the suggestion (“Yes you can find your own 
tenant, but it has to be…”). The second, material, suggestion (c), falls by the wayside, for 
the lessor uses email for the second thing it does best: providing a quick, informal answer to 
a query. 
This leaves the tenant with uphill work. In a face-to-face discussion it is normal to 
hear the parties say “Can we just go back to [the issue of time] – what did you think about 
my point about [restrictions for 10 years?]”, but it is arguable that a point that is already on 
record in print as a conditional offer will count as  “sharpened” if it is repeated (following 
the rule of reinstated requests (Labov & Fanshel, 1977): The more times you say “When are 
you going to clear up in here?”, the sharper it sounds). Hence the tenant abandons the point 
in turn 6 and tries, unsuccessfully, to assuage the lessor in the few remaining turns. 
 
3. Discussion 
There is good reason to believe that it is this structural ambiguity in the medium that is 
the source of the problem. Discussed up against the predictions of media richness theory, 
email negotiation results fall into two categories, roughly following the division made by 
Dennis, Fuller & Valacich (2008): questions of information exchange are different from 
questions of agreement. 
We assumed initially that email is a well suited medium if a negotiation is dependent 
on quantities of text and complex arguments: cognitively speaking, the load is so much 
easier to handle than trying to keep all the text possibilities present in the mind at once. This 
leads to long turns, containing several structural moves. But email is also well suited to 
quick, informal feedback.  
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When these two characteristics collide, the exchanges get “out of sync”. Seen from the 
talk-like perspective, a lengthy email violates normal turn-taking norms, and in fact, length 
is also against the norms of ordinary business interchange: in a study by Thomas et al. 
(2006) managers report that 70% of their mails take less than one minute to read. Friedman 
and Currall suggest that “piling it on” may produce aggression in the receiver, principally 
because it is frustrating not to be able to give feedback as points occur. Also, anyone 
exposed to a series of arguments will attend first to the weakest (or, in Friedman and 
Currall’s case, the most anger-provoking) item on the list, while conveniently forgetting the 
rest. 
This brings us to the question of agreement. Studies of agreement are normally carried 
out in a group that needs to bring different types of information to the table (including 
electronic tables) in order to select the optimal solution; the members do not normally have 
opposing interests. This, however, is the case in negotiation. When a large amount of 
information serves as argumentation for an underlying interest, there is a temptation for 
Other not to engage with it, but rather to send large amounts of information back, arguing 
for his or her own side (as a negotiation tactic, this is known as “snowballing”.) Obstacle 
number one is, then, that email encourages a tendency to produce one-sided arguments for 
one’s own side, a move characteristic of deadlock (Bülow-Møller, 2005; Roloff, Tutzauer & 
Dailey, 1989). 
But as it was seen in the corpus discussed above, many turns ended with an over-to-
you formulation, inviting response to a proposal. Successful exchanges would not only deal 
with the questions raised, they would take stock, sometimes with numbered bullet points; 
but email has a particular affordance that seems to function as obstacle number two: it is 
easier to block suggestions. Among the features examined above, the most important 
indicator of deadlock is the tendency to select one proposal at the time and forget the rest of 
the message, thus stopping discussion about other aspects of the offer. The short rejections 
in the corpus are followed a few turns later by one of the parties “walking away from the 
table”; this action, too, is far less dramatic in virtual space, compared with somebody getting 
up and leaving the room. 
The conclusion is therefore that in the cases where email negotiations go wrong, a 
richer medium with voice or immediacy would not necessarily make a difference – it is 
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something the email medium can do, rather than what it cannot do, that makes it easier for a 
negotiator to terminate talks. 
Further work is needed that separates the variables in the study. For one thing, testing 
the usefulness of email for prolonged processes should throw some light on business 
people’s choice of channels in the single steps; and secondly, the intercultural angle should 
be more explicitly studied with the control of native speakers. In the meantime, there is a 
pedagogical task in raising the awareness of the communicative characteristics of email for 
negotiators. 
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